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JURISDICTION-QUASI IN REM: SEIDER v. ROTH
TO TURNER v. EVERS-
WRONG MEANS TO THE RIGHT END
I. INTRODUCTION
Turner v. Evers,' a recent lower state court decision in California,
has followed a line of New York cases beginning with Seider v.
Roth2 in 1966, which have held an insurer's contractual obliga-
tions3 under a liability insurance policy to be subject to attachment
by the plaintiff as "debts" owed to the defendant-insured [herein-
after-insured]. Such "debts" constitute property of the insured
under the earlier cases of Matter of Riggle's Estate4 in New York
and Keck v. Superior Court5 in California, and may serve as a basis
for quasi in rem jurisdiction in the state in which the property may
be found. Adding the concept of Harris v. Balk6-that the debt
follows the debtor and may thus be attached wherever personal
jurisdiction of the debtor may be attained-the practical result is
that the insurer may be forced to defend in the plaintiff's home
state even though the tortious incident happened in the insured's
home state. The rationale of Seider and Turner is that the insured's
debtor, his insurance carrier, can most likely be found doing busi-
ness in the plaintiff's home state and, although the tortious inci-
dent occurred in a foreign state, the plaintiff may return to his
home forum and attach the insurer's obligations.
The Seider procedure has struck many as unfair and impractical
to the insured and his insurance carrier. Indeed, the Seider proce-
dure had always been rejected in states other than New York
7
1. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Super. Ct., App.
Dep't 1973).
2. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
3. In Turner, the insurer's contractual obligations were held to be
property within the meaning of attachment statutes relating to contract ac-
tions against non-residents.
4. 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
5. 3 Civil No. 13521 (Cal., filed Nov. 14, 1972).
6. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
7. See, e.g., DeRentiss v. Lewis, 258 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1969); Jardive v.
Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964); Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19
Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967).
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and has been the target of much criticism by commentators. s On
the other hand, the procedure has the potential to supply a remedy
for a valid action where otherwise a remedy would be, in a practi-
cal sense, unavailable.
The goal of the Seider cases, providing a resident plaintiff with a
home forum,9 must be balanced with the desirability of forcing the
insured and the insurer to defend in the plaintiff's home forum.
The thesis presented is that a direct action against the insurer would
achieve such balance.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Turner v. Evers
In Turner, plaintiffs, residents of California temporarily in Wash-
ington, had their car serviced in a Tacoma service station for the
return trip to California. The car subsequently became inoperable.
Turner claimed that Evers had failed to service the car properly
and that $658.16 in damage was sustained for additional repair ex-
pense and loss of use of the car. In California, the plaintiffs ob-
tained a writ of attachment 0 "directing the attachment of property
of defendant and specifically the garnishment . . . of [the] liability
insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify [Evers']
debt owing [to the plaintiffs] ."11
Evers' motion to quash personal and quasi in rem jurisdiction was
granted on the basis that he neither conducted business nor owned
property in California. On appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate
Department, reversed, holding that the motion to quash was im-
properly granted and that the insured's rights to a defense and in-
demnification consituted "property" within the meaning of the at-
tachment statutes.12
8. See, e.g., Siegel, Practice Commentary to N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5201
(McKinney Supp. 1972); Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability
Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1075 (1968); Comment, Garnishment of In-
tangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 550 (1969).
9. See Siegel, supra note 8, at 60; Comment, Attachment of Liability
Insurance Policies, 53 CouILL L. REV. 1108, 1118 (1968).
10. CAL. CODE Cxv. PROC. § 537, subd. 2 (West 1970).
11. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 14, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390, 392 (Super. Ct.,
App. Dep't 1973).
12. The motion to quash was treated as a motion to quash the attach-
ment since that was the way the parties had treated it. The court noted
The court recognized the weak limb it was climbing on by pred-
icating jurisdiction on Seider v. Roth, stating "to our knowledge
it is the first case outside of New York that accepts, rather than re-
jects Seider."'13 The Turner court relied heavily on Minichiello v.
Rosenberg,14 a Second Circuit decision, for a complete discussion of
the Seider procedure.
B. The Seider Rationale
The fact situations in Seider and Minichiello are similar: a New
York resident injured in an out of state accident with a non-resident
whose insurance carrier did business in New York. In Seider,
two New York residents were injured in a Vermont automobile
accident caused by the negligence of a visiting Canadian resident,
Lemiux. No basis existed for personal jurisdiction over Lemiux
for suit brought in New York. However, Lemiux was insured by a
carrier which maintained business offices in New York and Seider
was successful in attaching the obligations the insurance company
owed to Lemiux. The rationale was that the insurer's obligations,
i.e., investigation of the accident and duty to defend and indemnify,
were seizable in New York as "debts" owed to Lemiux. Thus, un-
der these circumstances, a New York plaintiff may sue at home
without benefit of a long arm statute and without personal juris-
diction over the defendant. The insurer's obligations are "debts"
under Matter of Riggle's Estate, and under Harris v. Balk all the
New York plaintiff need do to attach these "debts" is attain per-
sonal jurisdiction over the debtor-insurance carrier.",
C. The Jurisdictional Foundations of Seider
The Seider procedure requires personal jurisdiction over the in-
surer and quasi in rem jurisdiction over the insured. Expanding
concepts of both bases of jurisdiction led to the Seider result.
Traditional tests for personal jurisdiction were made unworkable
by the increasing mobility of individuals and the growth of multi-
that the defendant could not defeat quasi in rem jurisdiction by a special
appearance to quash service on him since the court in fact has jurisdiction
of his property as a result of the attachment or seizure and can render a
valid judgment enforceable against the property. Id. at Supp. 15, 107
Cal. Rptr. at 393.
13. Id. at Supp. 12, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 391. See Rintala v. Shoemaker,
362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973) for another recent case following the
Seider procedure.
14. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
15. The Harris v. Balk rule is permissive. Not all states have extended
jurisdictional limits to those of Harris. See EmuwLwKEG, COXqruCT OF
LAWS, 101 (1962).
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state corporations. 16 International Shoe Co. v. Washington'7 mark-
ed replacement of the quantitative due process tests of consent,1 8
presence, 19 and domicile20 with the qualitative tests of fairness and
reasonableness. To be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a
state, there need only be "minimum contacts" with the state such
that the exercise of jurisdiction did not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."2 ' In Seider and subsequent
New York decisions, the presence of the insurer doing business in
New York was sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" test.
The major relevant force in the growth of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion has been the landmark case of Harris v. Balk.22 Harris, a citi-
zen of North Carolina, owed money to Balk, another North Caro-
lina resident. While Harris was temporarily in Maryland, the debt
he owed to Balk was garnished by a creditor of Balk. The ra-
tionale of the Court was that the indebtedness followed the debtor
and could be attached wherever the debtor was subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction.2 3 When the constitutionality of the Seider pro-
cedure was challenged in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, the court re-
lied on Harris.2 4 Applying Harris, the presence of the insurance
carrier debtor in New York meant presence of the debt in New
York. This debt could be attached by the plaintiff having person-
al jurisdiction over the insurer, and thus supplied a basis for quasi
in rem jurisdiction over the insured.2 5 As a result, similar New
York plaintiffs are provided with a home forum which could not
have been obtained by personal jurisdiction over the insured.
As the California court in Turner v. Evers noted, the Seider pro-
cedure has been subject to a great deal of criticism.2 6 Most of the
16. See generally Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Cal-
ifornia Under New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HAST.
L.J. 1163 (1970).
17. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
18. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
19. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
20. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
21. 326 U.S. at 316.
22. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
23. See Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 AST. L.J. 1219,
1224-26 (1970).
24. 410 F.2d 106, 118 (2d Cir. 1968).
25. See Green, supra note 23.
26. 31 Cal. App. 3d at Supp. 18, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
criticism is aimed not at the end result of Seider, providing a home
forum to a resident plaintiff, but at the means by which this is real-
ized.
D. Criticism of the Seider Procedure
The dissent in Seider centered on the contingent nature of the
obligations attached.27 Obligations to defend and indemnify are
contingent upon the commencement of suit and the awarding of
damages. 28 Medical payments depend on proof of the extent of in-
jury and whether to investigate the accident or not is discre-
tionary with the insurance carrier.29 The dissenting judge felt
that such contingent obligations fell outside the definition of at-
tachable obligations found in CPLP 5201 (Subd. a), i.e., one which
is "past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand
of the judgment debtor."30
The dissent also claimed that Seider was guilty of a bootstrap
situation:
The existence of the policy is used as a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion to start the very action necessiry to activate the insurer's ob-
ligation under the policy. In other words, the promise to defend
the insured is assumed to furnish the jurisdiction for a civil suit
which must be validly commenced before the obligation to defend
can possibly accrue.31
In Podolsky v. Devinney,32 the court commented that the com-
plexity of the obligation to defend, the continuing duties of the in-
sured to his insurance carrier and the exclusions present in the
policy "militate against the characterization as a simple debt."
33
27. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315-16, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (dissent-
ing opinion). See also Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 320, 234
N.E.2d 669, 677-78, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 645 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
28. "It is the most tenuous of nominalist thinking that accords the
status of an asset, leviable and attachable, to a contingent liability to de-
fend and indemnify under a public liability insurance policy." Simpson
v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 314, 234 N.E.2d 669, 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,
640 (1967) (dissenting opinion). But see Brainard v. Rogers, 74 Cal.
App. 247, 239 P. 1095 (1925) dealing with a definite liability under a fire
insurance contract but uncertainty as to the amount of liability.
29. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 121 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissenting
opinion).
30. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (dissenting
opinion).
31. Id. See also Stein, supra note 8, at 1083; Comment, supra note 8,
at 555.
32. 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). States have declined to follow
Seider by refusing to treat the insurer's obligations as simple debts. See,
e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App.
1970) ; Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
33. 281 F. Supp.at 494.
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Commentators have also attacked the Seider procedure on the
grounds that it may be an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce,34 an increase on court congestion and expense,3 5 a dis-
couragement to cooperation by the insured,36 and an open door to
undesirable forum shopping by the plaintiff.37
The Seider doctrine depends in large part on the continued via-
bility of Harris v. Balk.38 Arguments of unconstitutionality of
Seider were called unpersuasive as long as Harris stands.8 9 As long
as a debt is attachable wherever the debtor may be found, a foun-
dation will exist for Seider. But, reliance on Harris has been criti-
cized since the debt in Harris was a fixed amount, admittedly owed,
and only subject to presence and thus garnishment in one state
at a time because the debtor was an individual.40 Since the obli-
gations or "debts" the insurance carrier owes the insured exist
wherever personal jursidiction- over the insurer may be attained,
any state following the Seider procedure could lay claim to being
the situs of the policy.41 The Minichiello dissent, quoting Seider
critic Professor David D. Siegel, argued that this could lead to "jur-
isdictional chaos": 42
Balk at least enabled a single state to be isolated as the situs of
the intangible. Under Seider that is not possible; all of the states
in which the insurer does business could seize the policy; and if
they were to do so (i.e. adopt Seider) there would be a kind
of jurisdictional chaos awaiting in major accident cases.43
Harris has also been said to be out of touch with modern juris-
dictional thinking.44 The decision is from the Pennoyer v. Neff 45
era when garnishment of intangibles served as a valuable sub-
34. See Stein, supra note 8, at 1087; Siegel, supra note 8, at 60.
35. See Siegel, supra note 8, at 52.
36. See Comment, supra note 8, at 556.
37. Id., at 565; Comment, 32 Am. TRIAL LAWYER's J. 328, 335 (1968).
38. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
39. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 118 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. See Siegel, supra note 8, at 21.




44. See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1178 (1966); Developments in the
Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 957-60 (1960).
45. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
stitute to personal jurisdiction.46 The modem trend is toward a
less mechanical 47 and more reasonable approach grounding jurisdic-
tion on considerations of fairness to the parties and relevance of
the matter before the court to the forum.48 Writers have suggested
that extension of the International Shoe doctrine to quasi in rem
situations will lead to a practical elimination of state boundaries,49
and the end of any distinction between when personal and quasi
in rem jurisdiction may be exercised. 50 Chief Judge Fuld noted in
Simpson v. Loehmann that:
The historical limitations on both in personam and in rem juris-
diction, with their rigid tests, are giving way to a more realistic and
reasonable evaluation of the respective rights of the plaintiffs, de-
fendants and the State in terms of fairness. (citations omitted)
Such an evaluation requires a practical appraisal of the situation
of the various parties rather than an emphasis upon somewhat
magical and medieval concepts of presence and power.51
A leading case in this trend, Atkinson v. Superior Court,52 applied
the minimum contacts test of International Shoe to the determina-
tion of whether quasi in rem jurisdiction should be exercised over
intangibles. It has been suggested that the Atkinson trend marks
the end of distinctions between quasi in rem and in personam
jurisdiction 583 and incidentally the end of the Harris v. Balk rule 4
46. See Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 58, 65-66 (1968).
47. See EEMRENZWEIG, supra note 15, at 102-03; Carrington, The Modern
Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HAi-v. L. REv. 303, 309 (1963).
48. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
49. See Green, supra note 23, at 1242.
50. Id.
51. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967).
52. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
53. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. REv.
657, 663 (1959): "It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions
between in rem and in personam, high time now in a mobile society where
property increasingly becomes intangible and the fictional res becomes
stranger and stranger ... They cannot evaluate the real factors (that
should determine jurisdiction) squarely until they give up the ghost of
the res." See also, Jurisdiction, Quasi In Rem: A New Basis for Jurisdic-
tion Over Intangibles in California, 46 CALIw. L. REV. 637 (1958).
54. Atkinson must be read in light of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958). Hanson indicates that territoriality is still at least a consideration
in determining jurisdiction. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CEE.
L. REv. 569, 623 (1958).
In Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), a non-
resident plaintiff attempted to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant on a cause of action arising outside the state. The
court relied on Hanson v. Denckla in concluding that the territorial concept
was still valid and that the distinction between in rein and in personam
actions still exists. Citing Harris v. Balk, the court concluded that the
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as not satisfying the minimum contacts test.55
E. Purpose of the Seider Doctrine
The Seider doctrine is an attempt to provide a home forum to a
resident plaintiff. Traditional theory requires the "attacking"
plaintiff to go to the defendant for redress. However, this may be
changing:
There has been a movement away from the bias favoring the de-
fendant in matters of personal jurisdiction toward permitting the
plaintiff to insist that the defendant come to him when there is
sufficient basis for doing so.50
The burden on the real party in interest, the insurer,57 in litiga-
ing the case in plaintiff's home state may be greater than in the
state of the tort.58 However, it would probably be a relatively
greater burden on the plaintiff to travel to the tort state to litigate
since the insurer likely has offices and manpower already estab-
lished in plaintiff's home state as part of its interstate nature.
59
A valid action under the Seider procedure is not so likely to be
prohibitively expensive for the plaintiff to pursue. New York
courts have noted the fact that the plaintiff may not be able to
afford to litigate in the foreign jursidiction as justifying the exer-
cise of quasi in rem jurisdiction over the non-resident insured.
60
presence of the res, in the form of a potential defendant's debtor, within
the jurisdiction presented a crucial point of contact.
55. Compare Hanson v. Denckla and Atkinson v. Superior Court with
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
56. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1967),
quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 44, at 1128.
57. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968). See also,
Siegel, supra note 8, at 46-47; Note, The Liability Insurer as a Real Party
in Interest: Proposed Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 41 MINx. L. REV. 784 (1957).
58. Wherever the action is brought, one of the parties will have to
undergo the expense of transporting witnesses to the trial. The insurer's
witnesses will likely be located in the state of the accident while the
plaintiff's medical witnesses will likely reside in the plaintiff's home state,
where he receives his medical attention. See Comment, supra note 9,
at 1119.
59. A parallel may be drawn with no-fault liability, i.e., shifting the cost
from the insured party to the insurer, who can spread the cost among a
larger group of people. See generally Fleming, The Role of Negligence in
Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815 (1967).
60. McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
This then assures the cooperation of the insurer in the resident
plaintiff's action. Similarly, the court in Turner v. Evers noted that
Turner's claim of $658.16 in damages may be effectively denied if
he were forced to pursue a remedy in Washington.61 The result in
a Turner situation is appealing: a remedy is provided for a valid
action where before the remedy may have been prohibitively ex-
pensive to seek. Ideally, a remedy for a valid action should not be
discouraged by the burden of bringing suit.
The Seider procedure thus helps satisfy a need for a viable rem-
edy. On the other hand, the method of Seider has been criticized
as impractical and of questionable constitutionality. Such criticism
stems primarily from the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction over
the insured. Is it possible to attain the same result, a home forum
for a resident plaintiff, without the exercise of quasi in rem juris-
diction?
III. A MORE DEsIn RLE MEAxs
The Seider doctrine is in effect a judicially created direct action
against the insurer.0 2 The exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
merely uses the insured as a conceptual conduit to reach the insur-
ance carrier, the real party in interest.63 The results of Seider and
of direct actions against the insurer are the same: the usual policy
provisions requiring final judgment against the insured before
the insurer's obligations arise are overridden. However, states
with a true direct action64 avoid the practical and constitutional
problems caused by the attachment of the insurance policies.
Professor Siegal has written:
The in rem trappings do not help one whit, and hurt intensely.
They take endless quantities of judicial time, to say nothing of that
of the lawyers, without adding one jot of benefit to justify the ef-
fort.0 5
Furthermore, the conceptual basis of attachment has been chal-
lenged in recent years. Quasi in rem jurisdiction has been de-
scribed as a
fiction which necessarily hinders rather than helps to formulate
an appropriate body of doctrine to guide the courts in determining
61. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 24, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390, 399 (Super. Ct., App.
Dep't 1973).
62. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968).
63. Id.
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 68-612 (1967); LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 22:655
(1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS Am. § 27-7-1 (1956) (1968 Reenactment); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 260.11 (Supp. 1969).
65. See Siegel, supra note 8, at 51.
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whether a given forum is an appropriate one for the determination
of the legal and factual issues which are presented by a law suit.66
If the action is brought in rem simply to provide a conceptual
basis for reaching the insurer via the insured,6 7 why not recog-
nize the procedure for what it is-a direct action against the insur-
ance carrier?
A. Direct Actions
Insurers traditionally seek to avoid direct actions by no-action
clauses intended to conceal the existence of insurance from the
jury for fear of inflated verdicts.68 "The law maintains the fiction
that the insured is the real party in interest at the trial . . . [only]
in order to protect the insurance companies against overly sym-
pathetic juries (citations omitted). 69 This fiction may no longer
be necessary since the contemporary jury assumes the presence of
liability insurance.70 Also, Louisiana and Wisconsin, which have
direct action statutes, have experienced very low verdicts in com-
parison with other states.
7 1
A direct action to replace the Seider procedure would differ
significantly in one respect from direct actions presently existing
in a few states. These states limit application of the direct ac-
tion to tortious incidents occurring within the borders of the state.
72
This limitation would fall short of satisfying the objective of the
Seider procedure-providing a home forum to a resident plaintiff
injured outside the state. The advocated direct action, whether
66. See Kurland, supra note 54, at 617.
67. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968).
68. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 75-76
(1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
69. Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167, 225
N.E.2d 503, 507, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (1967).
70. See Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 118, 204 N.E.2d 622,
626, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577, 582-83 (1965); Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 132,
21 N.W.2d 311, 320 (1946); PROssR, TORTS, at 549 (4th ed. 1971). This pre-
sumption may harm an uninsured motorist since cases have held it to be
improper for that defendant to show that he does not have insurance.
See, e.g., Avent v. Tucker, 188 liss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940).
71. Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-
Laws Problems, 74 HARv. L. REV. 357, 358 n.12 (1960).
72. See supra note 64. Arkansas, however, permits a direct action for
injuries sustained in a foreign country, if the tortfeasor's insurer is subject
to Arkansas jurisdiction. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 3244 (1966).
created legislatively or judicially, should not be limited by the
boundaries of the state.
73
1. Legislative Action
Most liability insurance contracts contain a no-action clause fore-
closing all obligations of the insurer to indemnify until after a final
judgment is secured against the insured. However, a state may act
directly to override such no-action provisions subject only to due
process considerations. 74 In Watson v. Employer's Liability Assur-
ance Corp.,75 the Supreme Court allowed Louisiana to override a no-
action clause in an insurance contract written outside the state on
the theory that Louisiana had sufficient state interests in the acci-
dent. In Watson, the tort occurred within the state. A focal point
of the Simpson and Minichiello decisions was whether New York
had similar legitimate interests to justify overriding the no-action
clause when the accidents took place outside of New York.76 The
Supreme Court in Watson stated:
Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisi-
ana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them.
Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana homes or
hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute.
They may be compelled to call on friends, relatives or the public
for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in the in-
jured by providing remedies for the recovery of damages. It
has similar interests in policies of insurance which are designed to
assure ultimate payment of such damages.77
The Minichiello majority held that sufficiently similar state in-
terests to those enunciated in Watson existed so that "the Supreme
Court would sustain the validity of a state statute permitting direct
actions against insurers ... in favor of residents as well as on be-
half of persons injured within it."'7s On the other hand, Judge An-
derson, dissenting, emphasized the occurrence of the accident in
Louisiana as the source of Louisiana's state interests.79 This view,
had it been the majority, would preclude the use of Watson 'as
authority validating direct actions in favor of residents.
73. See Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider
Back Into its Bottle, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 660, 669-87 (1971).
74. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930). See also Note,
supra note 71, at 387-92.
75. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
76. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109-10, 113-15 (2d Cir. 1968);
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 312-13, 317-18, 234 N.E.2d 669, 673,
676-77, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 638-39, 643-44 (1967).
77. 348 U.S. at 72. Compare Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179
(1964).
78. 410 F.2d at 110.
79. Id. at 115. See also Comment, supra note 8, at 559; Note, supra
note 77, at 389.
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The Minichiello majority view seems preferable. The predomi-
nate purpose of a direct action is to protect the rights of the in-
jured party by insuring a financially responsible defendant. This
purpose does not end when the individual temporarily crosses a
state line.
The Supreme Court has held that the domicile state may have
sufficient interests to apply its laws in workman's compensation
cases. In Alaska Packer's Association v. Industrial Accident Com-
qnission,80 the Court held that California, as domicile, could apply
its own laws although the relevant injury occurred elsewhere.
The Court noted that without a remedy in California such incapaci-
tated claimants "would be remediless, and there was the danger
that they might become public charges, both matters of grave pub-
lic concern to the state."' Similar state interests would be present
in the application of a direct action in favor of residents suggesting
that such a direct action would be valid.
Though injured in another state, the typical plaintiff will nor-
mally return to his home state for the bulk of his medical atten-
tion. In another workmen's compensation case,82 the Supreme
Court noted this fact with language that by analogy favors the
Minichiello majority:
The State where the employee lives has perhaps even a larger con-
cern [than the state where the tort occurs], for it is there that he
is expected to return; and it is on his community that the impact
of the injury is apt to be most keenly felt.83
The interstate character of insurance carriers has also been
thought by the Court to be a valid consideration in allowing forum
states to apply their own law in changing the terms of the in-
surance contract. In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,8 4 Florida
was allowed to apply its five year statute of limitation on filing
claims of personal property loss despite the fact that the insurance
contract barred such claims after twelve months. The policy had
been written in Illinois where the claimant had then resided, but
the Court noted that the insurance carrier did not confine coverage
to Illinois: "Particularly since the company was licensed to do busi-
80. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
81. Id. at 542.
82. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1964).
83. Id. at 41.
84. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
ness in Florida, it must have known it might be sued there."s8 5 Since
an insurance carrier must be doing business within the direct ac-
tion state to be subject to the direct action, applying the lan-
guage of Clay suggests that the insurance carrier would have
thereby knowingly consented to suit under that state's direct action.
Assuming the majority opinion in Minichiello, that a direct ac-
tion in favor of residents would be constitutional,86 two conditions
appear from the Seider line of cases to be necessary before such
a direct action could be applied by a state. First, the plaintiff
would have to be a resident of the state. In Farrel v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc.,87 a wrongful death action was brought in New York
by the administrators of the estates of non-residents killed in a
North Carolina plane crash. The court noted the lack of New
York contacts with the action except for the doing of business by
the insurer within New York. The court doubted that New York
could constitutionally call upon the insured to respond noting that
"[t] he constitutional doubt arises from New York's lack of meaning-
ful contact with the claim; a court of another state cannot supply
this by picking a New Yorker as administrator of the estate of a
non-resident who has suffered a fatal injury."88  In another in-
stance, a New York court held that exercise of jurisdiction upon
the sole contact of presence of defendant's insurance carrier would
adversely affect the administration of justice in New York by re-
sulting in an influx of unwarranted and unnecessary lawsuits.89
In light of the stated purpose of Seider, supplying a home forum
to a resident plaintiff,90 restriction of the procedure to residents of
that state seems only reasonable.
The second condition necessary before the state could override
an insurance contract's no-action clause is the presence of the in-
surance carrier doing business within the state. Without this
condition, the state would be attempting to alter the insurance con-
tract on the sole basis of the plaintiff's residence. Residence alone
has not been a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. In
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,91 the Supreme Court concluded that
although Dick's permanent residence was in Texas, he was present
85. Id. at 182.
86. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Victor, 393 U.S. 7 (1968), was dismissed by
the Supreme Court "for want of a substantial federal question" possibly
deciding the issue.
87. 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969).
88. Id. at 817.
89. Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968).
90. See Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 673.
91. 281U.S. 397 (1930).
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and acting in Mexico at all relevant times. Texas therefore was
without power to affect the terms of contracts so made.
92
In California and New York the "doing business" test is equiva-
lent93 to the minimum contacts test of International Shoe.9 4 Cases
have indicated that the necessary contacts may be quite slight in a
Seider context.9 5
2. Judicial Creation of a True Direct Action
A true direct action may be created by judicial decision as the
Supreme Court of Florida did in Shingleton v. Bussey.9 6 The Flor-
ida Court concluded that a "direct cause of action now inures to a
third party beneficiary 97 against an insurer in motor vehicle lia-
bility insurance coverage cases as a product of the prevailing pub-
lic policy of Florida."9 8  Up until the time of Shingleton, Florida
law had required final judgment against the insured as a condition
precedent to bringing an action against the insurer.9 9 In fact,
direct legislation had in the past failed passage. 109 The court
avoided the no-action clause calling it "axiomatic" that
92. Id. at 408. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where
despite the convenience to the plaintiff in suing at home, the test was said
to be whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting, felt that residence of the plaintiff should be ade-
quate for jurisdiction as long as the defendant is not inconvenienced. Id.
at 259. Accord, Ehrenzweig, Ehrenzweig in Reply, 9 J. Or PuB. L. 328,
331 (1960).
93. See Henry R. Jahn & Son Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855,
323 P.2d 437 (1958); Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 16, at 1168.
94. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
95. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439,
260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965). If "presence" or "doing business" is the basis of
jurisdiction, the cause of action need not be related to forum activities.
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). But if
the defendant's forum activities do not reach such a proportion to make
the defendant "present" within the forum, the particular cause of action
must arise out of or be connected with the defendant's forum related activ-
ity. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d
57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
96. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
97. See Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 I. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12
(1965), relied on extensively by the Florida Supreme Court.
98. 223 So. 2d at 715.
99. See Thompson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
100. Comment, Civil Procedure: Judicial Creation of Direct Action
Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145, 146 n.12
(1969).
by the very nature of liability insurance ... liability of the in-
sured is a condition precedent to liability of the insurer on the
cause of action against it by the injured third party. Such condi-
tion, however, does not effect a postponement in liability to be
sued but only makes the liability of the insurer to judgment con-
tingent on the establishment of liability to judgment of the in-
sured .... 101
The public interest and third party beneficiary rationale of Shing-
leton was extended to all forms of liability insurance in Beta Eta
House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory,10 2 allowing joinder of
the insurance company as party defendant in tort actions against
the insured.10 3
A judicial decision overriding the no-action clause of the insur-
ance contract could avoid questions of unconstitutional impairment
of contracts. 10 4 As the Supreme Court noted in Tidal Oil Co. v.
Flanagan,'0 5 the provision of the Federal Constitution protecting the
obligations of contracts against state action, is directed only at leg-
islative impairment and not at judgments of courts.'0 6
In California, a judgment is required against the insured before
the injured party may proceed directly against the insurer'
0 7 un-
less the policy, or the statute or ordinance under which it was is-
sued, inures to the benefit of third parties. 0 8 The policy only in-
ures to the benefit of third parties when that intent clearly ap-
pears in the contract of insurance, "and if any doubt exists it should
be construed against such interests."' 0 9
However, if subsequent California cases follow Turner v. Evers,"0
the result may be to encourage California to follow Florida's ex-
ample and permit a direct action against the insurer via a defini-
101. 223 So. 2d at 716-17.
102. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970). A direct action statute may be more
desirable if piecemeal expansion of a judicial direct action is not wanted.
It is questionable whether the presumption of automobile liability insur-
ance means a presumption of all liability insurance. An insurer's desire
to avoid a direct action may be more valid in the latter situation.
103. COUCH ON INsURANcE 2d 75:538. "In the absence of some pro-
hibition, the injured person having a right of direct action may join both
the insured and insurer as codefendants even though the policy con-
tains a "no-action" clause."
104. See Comment, supra note 100, at 152.
105. 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
106. Id. at 451.
107. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1972).
108. Spencer v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 797,
799, 313 P.2d 900, 901 (1957).
109. Id. See also Gibbons v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 812,
825, 79 Cal. Rptr. 438, 441-42 (1969).
110. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Super. Ct., App.
Dep't 1973).
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tive judicial decision."'' As Professor Siegel says of New York:
[D]irect action is the law of the state right now via the decisional
route. Seider, after the Simpson reargument decision is nothing
more or less than a direct action. The only difference is that it
stands in rem. [Tjhis insistence on the in rem form is itself re-
sponsible for many... procedural problems .... 112
If the Seider-Turner result is desired, and that result is essentially
already a direct action, existence of such procedural problems as
New York has experienced should encourage the court to skip the
insured, the mere conduit to reach the insurer,11 and go straight
at the insurance carrier via a true direct action.
B. Fairness to all Parties-A Balancing Act
In his Minichiello dissent, Judge Anderson stated that the plain-
tiff's right to require the defendant's presence in plaintiff's forum
should be based upon the "fairness and reasonableness of the de-
vice as it affects all of the parties involved, the functioning of the
courts, and the administration of justice in such an action."" 4 He
classified long arm statutes as "fair" since the defendant volun-
tarily brought himself into the bounds of the state where the acci-
dent occurred whereas an Alaska resident driving to his corner
store could be forced to defend in New York, under Seider, if it
was his misfortune to cause an accident with a visiting New
Yorker."
5
A true direct action would avoid much of the Alaskan's burden
and preclude the necessity of the New Yorker to return to Alaska
111. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1972), is a part of every insurance
policy and creates a contractual relation which inures to the benefit of
any person who might be injured by the insured. The primary purpose
of the statute is to protect the injured when the insured is insolvent, in
effect making the tort-feasee a creditor beneficiary. Johnson v. Holmes
Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury, 160 Cal. App. 2d 290, 298, 325 P.2d 193, 198 (1958).
The statute thus protects the plaintiff's right to a remedy by assuring a
financially responsible defendant. The creditor beneficiary rationale could
be extended to protecting the plaintiff's right to a viable remedy by
allowing a direct action against the insurer rather than forcing the plain-
tiff to seek his remedy in another state which may prove prohibitively
expensive.
112. See Siegel, supra note 8, at 51.
113. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968).
114. Id. at 115 (dissenting opinion).
115. Id.
to pursue his remedy. Bringing the action in Alaska could be pro-
hibitively expensive for the plaintiff. A true direct action would
bypass the insured, and work against his insurance carrier-"16
as long as the insurer could be subjected to in personam jurisdic-
tion in the plaintiff's home forum.
1. Forum Non Conveniens
In Turner v. Evers, 17 the court suggested a path by which an
"overly enthusiastic but not an unconstitutional assertion of juris-
diction" 8 may be restricted. The doctrine of forum non conven-
iens"1 9 allows a court to refuse to entertain a law suit even though
it has jurisdiction over the parties if the forum is a severely incon-
venient forum for the trial of the action.120  The court may dismiss
when it believes that "the action before it may be more appro-
priately and justly tried elsewhere.' 2 1 Commentators have often
suggested that forum non conveniens could work as an effective
complement to the minimum contacts test of personal jurisdic-
tion.122 Both are couched in terms of "fairness" and together could
achieve the "fair and reasonable" balance between all parties that
Judge Anderson, in his Minichiello dissent, claimed to be lacking
in the Seider procedure. 23 However, forum non conveniens has
yet to be utilized to this extent in New York and California.
In California, if the plaintiff is a resident, it will be nearly
impossible for the defendant to take advantage of forum non con-
veniens. "Forum non conveniens has only an extremely limited
application to a case where ... the plaintiff is a bona fide resident
of the forum state.'1 24 This has been criticized as precluding the
vitality of the doctrine in cases where the plaintiff is a resident of
116. See Maxwell v. Southern Am. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 768, 770
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), holding that joinder of the insured is not neces-
sary; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs, § 135, comment e at 293-94
(Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
117. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Super. Ct., App.
Dep't 1973).
118. Id. at Supp. 24, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 399, quoting Mlinichiello v. Rosen-
berg, 410 F.2d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 1968).
119. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.30 (West 1973).
120. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See also Note,
Forum Non Conveniens in California: Code of Civil Procedure Section
410.30, 21 HAST. L.J. 1245 (1970).
121. Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44 (1944).
122. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 53, at 658; von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 44, at 1132.
123. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissent-
ing opinion).
124. Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 738, 742, 427 P.2d 765,
768, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (1967).
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California but the "defendant presents facts which reveal that
every consideration of fairness and judicial efficiency excludes that
state as an appropriate forum.1
125
New York has recently liberalized its forum non conveniens rule
in regard to the residence factor. Residence, though "an impor-
tant factor to be considered," is no longer controlling.126 Rather,
the motion should be granted when it "plainly appears that New
York is an inconvenient forum and that another is available which
will best serve the ends of justice and the convenience of the par-
ties."'1 27 In a recent Seider type case, however, a New York court
held that New York was not a "clearly inconvenient forum."' 28
Despite a persuasive dissent, 29 the court concluded, in denying the
forum non conveniens motion, that the ends of justice and conven-
ience did not conclusively favor the alternative forum.
As long as the residency factor effectively precludes a forum non
conveniens dismissal in all Seider type cases, "reasonable fairness"
to all concerned parties will often be denied. A flexible forum non
conveniens policy would encourage an equitable application of a
true direct action. But an extended use of forum non conveniens
is especially desirable with the present Seider procedure where the
action is initiated against the non-resident insured rather than the
interstate insurer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Turner court provided a plaintiff with the means to a need-
ed remedy where an effective remedy had before, for practical pur-
poses, been unavailable. Though the result is consistent with ex-
panding trends of jurisdiction, the Seider procedure employed by
the Turner court seems to be one improvised to reach a desired re-
125. Comment, The Proper Role of the Residence Factor in Forum Non
Conveniens Motions, 45 S. CAL. L. Rrv. 249, 262 (1972).
126. Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 361, 278 N.E.2d 619,
622, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1972).
127. Id.
128. Slaughter v. Waters, 41 App. Div. 2d 810, 342 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182
(1973).
129. "The stance of the majority makes the teachings of Silver v. Great
American Insurance Co., [citation omitted], utterly meaningless. Not a
shred of a connection, except residence, links this plaintiff to New York."
Id., (McGivern, J. dissenting).
sult but open to criticism in terms of fairness to all parties. An
expanded use of forum non conveniens would make the Seider pro-
cedure fairer to all concerned parties. But, since a true direct ac-
tion would achieve the same results without many of the problems
that accompany the in rem form of the Seider procedure, it is sub-
mitted that either a direct action statute or a judicially implemented
direct action favoring state residents is desirable.
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